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SYMPOSIUM
Battling Drugs: Is the War Working?
A symposium on the impact of the war on drugs on the courts, the
workplace, the treatment of addiction, and the development of Latin
America, held at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill on
March 19-21, 1990
Is Legalization the Answer?
Three speeches presented at the University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill on March 20, 1990
Ethan Nadelmann:*
Drug legalization is a controversial and emotional issue. The
first thing I must therefore ask is that you try as best as you can to
put aside your preconceptions and moral views about this issue and
ask yourself one simple question: Does what I'm saying make
sense-common sense? Just try to begin with that question.
Quite frankly, "legalization" is a terrible word. I never call my
articles "drug legalization" or "legalize drugs." Other people call
them that for me. Legalization usually suggests something that is
good. For example, "legalizing" political parties in Eastern and
Central Europe is a wonderful thing. Legalizing drugs is not a won-
derful thing. Legalization does not mean "drugs are wonderful,"
"drugs are great," "abuse drugs," or "use drugs."
Legalization is, rather, an alternative solution to the drug prob-
lem-one that means many different things to many different people.
To some, legalization just means taking the crime out of the drug
business, which to some extent it would. To some people it means
taking the money out of the drug business. Depending on how it is
done, it could do that as well. To many, legalization is an analytical
framework-one that says, "Let's examine our current prohibition
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policy and look at its costs and its benefits. Let's examine other drug
prohibition policies to determine their costs and benefits, and then
let's look at a whole variety of legalization policies (because there is
no one way to approach it) and consider their respective costs and
benefits. Then let's decide on the policy that is best."
For many people, "legalize drugs" is also a rallying cry in much
the same way that "repeal prohibition" was a rallying cry sixty years
ago-one that brought people together from across the country and
across the political spectrum. It brought people together with very
different reasons for supporting repeal of prohibition and with very
different notions about alternatives to prohibition. That is what is
interesting about today's drug legalization issue. One day my allies
are William Buckley, Milton Friedman, George Schultz, and the edi-
torial boards of half the conservative newspapers and magazines in
Europe, including The Economist, and the next day my ally is the head
of the American Civil Liberties Union, or the Democratic mayors of
some American cities, or members of various liberal organizations.
In between are a great variety of people from all walks of life, includ-
ing police, judges, criminal defense lawyers, drug treatment advo-
cates, and drug prevention advocates, as well as millions of ordinary
citizens with no professional connection to the drug issue.
Most importantly, drug legalization means that we should stop
treating the drug problem primarily as a criminal justice problem
and treat it instead primarily as a public health issue. The Mayor of
Baltimore, Kurt Schmoke, put it very well when he said that if we are
going to have a war against drugs, it should not be headed by the
Attorney General; it should be headed by the Surgeon General.
That is what I mean by drug legalization.
More broadly, when I'm talking about legalization, I am in fact
talking about making many illicit drugs legally available to adults in
this country-but not as easily available as cigarettes or even alcohol.
I am also talking about a convergence in our substance abuse policy.
I hope I don't get in trouble for saying this in North Carolina, but I
think we should be a little tougher on alcohol and a lot tougher on
tobacco. I think we could tax them a little more, regulate them a
little more, ban cigarette-vending machines, and advertise against to-
bacco and alcohol a little more-but we don't need to criminalize
them. At the same time, we should be tough in the same ways on the
drugs that are now illegal, but we should limit the criminal sanction
to prohibiting sales to children and enforcing the more limited gov-
ernment regulations.
Legalization also means a diversion of our resources. It means
taking the money that we are now throwing down the drain on in-
terdiction and enforcement and putting it where it can really make a
difference. To some extent, our money should go toward treatment.
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Treatment is no panacea, but it does help some people and it does
make people less likely to die and less likely to go out and hurt other
people. More importantly, our money should go toward drug pre-
vention. I'm not talking about a kindergarten through twelfth-grade
drug education, but about non-drug-specific drug prevention pro-
grams. I'm talking about investing in pre- and post-natal care, in
"Head Start" inner city school programs-investing in those inner-
city neighborhoods in a positive sense. These are the best methods
of preventing drug abuse. Not only are they more humane, but they
are also more cost effective, dollar-for-dollar, at producing non-
drug-abusing citizens than putting that same money in prisons or do-
ing nothing at all.
Now, why should we even discuss legalization? There are three
reasons. The first is that, in terms of the criminal justice approach to
the drug problem, everything we have done in the past, everything
we are doing now, and everything we are talking about doing in the
future is largely doomed to failure. The failure of the criminal jus-
tice approach has nothing to do with corruption in Latin America, or
turf wars between U.S. law enforcement agencies, or whether or not
we have a drug czar. What it has to do with is the nature of the
market, the nature of the commodity, and how lucrative the whole
thing is. Secondly, and more importantly, we need to recognize that
most of what we identify as "the drug problem" is in fact the result of
drug prohibition. This was the sort of realization that most Ameri-
cans came to sixty years ago in analyzing the relationship between
the alcohol problem and alcohol prohibition. They confronted in-
creasingly powerful organized criminals, rising levels of violence,
bootleggers taking over neighborhoods, overcrowded prisons and
court dockets, kids looking to bootleggers as role models, and tens
of thousands of people dead, poisoned, or blinded from bad bootleg
liquor-liquor that was nore dangerous because it was illegal. To-
day's drug problem is virtually identical. Finally, we need to con-
sider legalization because it just might be a better approach than the
current one. Indeed, we may have much less to fear from turning
our backs on drug prohibition than most people assume.
Let's take a quick look at the first problem with drug prohibi-
tion-its inherent limits. Some law enforcement officials-and far
more politicians-still insist that we can keep drugs out of this coun-
try. All of the evidence shows that they are wrong. Military involve-
ment and aid as a solution is ludicrous and a waste of billions of
dollars. Economic assistance may be based on good intentions, and
it may be useful for other reasons, but there is no reason to believe it
can affect the drug problem in the United States. Remember, these
drugs come from almost everywhere and can be grown almost any-
where. Opium, marijuana, and even coca can be grown in far more
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areas than where they are now being grown. Even where specific
enforcement efforts succeed, the overall impact on the United States
is negated by the "push down/pop up" effect. For example, you
push down on heroin coming out of Turkey and it pops up in Mex-
ico. You push down there, and it pops up in Southeast Asia. Push
down there, it pops up in Southwest Asia. We've now pushed down
so many places, it's popped up everywhere. The United States is
now a multisource heroin importer. The same effect has occurred
with marijuana. You push down on it in Mexico, it pops up in Ja-
maica. You push down there, it pops up in Colombia, and so on. We
haven't really pushed down yet on coca, but rest assured that when
we do, it will pop up some place else.
The peasants growing and harvesting these drugs earn good
money. They don't see the drug problem the way we do. To them it
is a good living. In many areas it is a crop that is as native to them as
tobacco is in this part of the world. Coca goes back thousands of
years in Latin America and opium thousands of years in some parts
of Asia. Moreover, many of these societies have never had problems
with these drugs. When Americans say drugs are immoral and drug
use is wrong, these peasants say, "Don't you tell me what my moral
obligations are. You know what my moral obligation is? It's not to
keep some stupid gringo from shoving some white powder up his.
nose or sticking a needle into his arm. No, that's not my moral obli-
gation. My moral obligation is to do the best I can for myself, my
family, and my community. If that means dealing in this drug, then
so be it. After all, am I really that different from your tobacco
farmer? Am I really that different?" They don't see drug use as a
moral issue no matter what the international conventions say.
Interdiction by the Coast Guard and the military doesn't make
any difference either. Trying to find the five to twenty tons of heroin
and one hundred to two hundred tons of cocaine amidst the billions
of tons of goods and tens of millions of people coming into this
country each year makes looking for a needle in a haystack seem like
child's play by comparison. Drugs come in every which way-by
large planes, small planes, large boats, small boats, and over land
borders with Mexico and Canada. These drugs come in packages, in
flowers, in chocolates, in sculptures, in parts of cars-you name it. It
is impossible to find these drugs. Interdiction does not make any
difference with respect to heroin or cocaine.
Interdiction has, however, managed to keep some marijuana
from entering the country, with the result that marijuana is generally
less available and more expensive than it was ten years ago. There
have been two other consequences as well. I heard about the first
from a top official in the Coast Guard's drug interdiction program.
He said: "As we've been increasingly successful in keeping marijuana
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from entering the country, the drug traffickers seem to be switching
to cocaine." What else would one expect? During prohibition, boot-
leggers switched from beer to hard liquor because liquor was more
compact. In Asia, when opium monopolies were eliminated, drug
dealers switched to heroin because it was ten times more compact
and didn't smell. What was the second consequence of our mari-
juana interdiction success? The United States has emerged as per-
haps the number one producer of marijuana in the world. Marijuana
is now reported to be the number one, two, or three cash crop in
Hawaii, California, Kentucky, Tennessee, and maybe even North
Carolina. Some people believe the United States now produces the
best marijuana in the world. Indeed, some people believe that if the
value of the dollar declines any further, the United States will be-
come a major exporter of marijuana.
Will enforcing our laws against the big drug traffickers here
make a difference? No, because every time you arrest number one,
number two is going to step into his shoes. Every time you arrest
number two, number three is going to step into. his shoes. Where do
the police get the information to arrest number one? They get it
from number two, because he wants to be number one. Similarly,
would extradition of the top Colombian drug traffickers make a dif-
ference? No. You get numero uno, numero dos steps in, then
numero tres. It would not make a difference. There may be other
good reasons to extradite or prosecute the major drug traffickers,
but we should not kid ourselves into believing that this would have
any impact on the availability of illegal drugs in the United States.
Would drug testing make a difference? If you told college stu-
dents they could not graduate unless they passed a daily urine test
for illicit drugs, it might decrease further the declining number of
students who use drugs. In fact, let me suggest to you an alternative
approach to the drug problem which will probably be technologically
possible in ten years. We could set up a nationally computerized sys-
tem containing everybody's name, social security number, finger-
prints, eye prints, and other unique, personal characteristics.
Everybody would have an outlet in their house or in their dorm
room. Every morning, by law, you would have to go up to that
machine and insert a piece of hair or a urine sample for a drug test.
If you fail, you would get an electrical shock. If you fail a second
time, you get a bigger shock. And so on. I think this would go a long
way toward eliminating the illicit drug use problem in this country.
But do I think we should solve the problem this way? The answer is
no. Why? Because I have concerns about things like privacy and
individual freedom. Moreover, where would it stop? Would alcohol
and tobacco be next? How about fried foods, since, after all, they
shorten your life span, too?
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Now let's take an even quicker look at the second problem with
drug prohibition-its costs and negative consequences. Forty per-
cent of the people in federal prisons are there on drug charges, and
fifty percent of the felony indictments in Washington, D.C., are on
drug charges. One million people are imprisoned in America today.
This is double what the prison population was ten years ago and al-
most triple what it was fifteen years ago. Can the criminal justice
approach to the drug problem really claim to be effective when
doubling and tripling the total prison population-and increasing by
far greater proportions the numbers of drug offenders-has done
absolutely nothing to reduce the number of crack babies or the
number of people who are dying with drug-related AIDS-the two
most severe effects of illicit drug abuse in this country? What is the
point of continuing a drug prohibition policy that effectively subsi-
dizes organized crime to the tune of ten, twenty, or fifty billion dol-
lars a year? What is the point of generating violence in our cities
where drug dealers are shooting not just one another but cops, wit-
nesses, and innocent bystanders, including children? What is the
point of transforming drug dealers into role models for kids in the
inner cities because they have the bucks, they have the women, and
they have the fast cars? Can we conclude that drug prohibition is
really keeping drugs out of the hands of people who want them? Not
so far as I can see. However, is it fair to say that drug prohibition is
generating tremendous levels of violence in Colombia and in
America? Yes, it is.
Legalization is so often characterized as a way to take the crime
out of the illegal drug business that people forget an equally impor-
tant reason for legalization: health and safety. Just as alcohol was
more dangerous when it was illegal, drugs are more dangerous be-
cause they are illegal. Fewer people might use drugs when they are
illegal, but the drugs being used are more dangerous. Heroin nor-
mally does not kill you or destroy your internal organs, but dirty her-
oin can kill you. If you take it with a dirty needle you can get
hepatitis or AIDS. You can "overdose" by injecting what you expect
is 4% heroin, but is really 40%, or not even heroin, but some am-
phetamine or synthetic opiate instead. Just imagine if every time you
drank a glass of wine, you did not know if it was 8% alcohol or 80%
alcohol, or if it was methyl alcohol or ethyl alcohol. Imagine if every
time you took an aspirin, you did not know if it was 5mg or 500mg.
Life would be a little more interesting, but also more dangerous.
Fewer people might drink wine and use aspirin, but more of those
who did would get sick and maybe die. This is what is happening to
illicit drug users. In short, nothing resembling an underground
Food and Drug Administration has emerged to regulate the quality
of illicit drugs on the streets. The result is that drugs are far more
dangerous than they otherwise would be.
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My final point is that drug legalization as an alternative ap-
proach to this nation's drug problems really boils down to a moral
argument. I essentially believe that legalization is the moral ap-
proach to the drug problem, and that criminalization and prohibition
are the immoral approaches. To begin with, it is impossible to make
a legitimate moral distinction between alcohol and tobacco and the
drugs that are now illegal. Ninety years ago, cigarettes were illegal in
twelve states and alcohol was illegal in many places. Marijuana, how-
ever, was legal, and cocaine was legal, as were heroin, opium, and
morphine-except for Chinese people in California. In many parts
of Europe three hundred years ago, one could receive the death pen-
alty for possession of tobacco. Today, these drug-related moralities
seem strange and alien to us, just as today's moral judgements about
drugs may seem strange to our children and grandchildren.
Even more important is my concern about the way we enforce
our drug laws. Electronic surveillance, informants, wiretapping, and
undercover operations are all methods that we need to use, but their
use should be kept to a minimum. Instead, our war on drugs has
caused a proliferation of these tactics. At the same time, we now see
children turning in their parents to the police when they find mari-
juana in their house, and parents turning in their children, as well-
not to a guidance counselor, but to the police.
This issue boils down to one basic principle-one that politi-
cians rarely talk about anymore, but that still rings true for most
Americans. It is that those people who do no harm to others should
not be harmed by others, and especially not by the state. The vast
majority of the sixty to seventy million Americans who have violated
the drug laws in recent years have done no harm to anybody else.
The policy of zero tolerance for drugs and drug users is, from my
perspective, morally wrong. As far as I am concerned, those people
who use illicit drugs and do not hurt anyone are not the state's con-
cern. If you use illicit drugs and you end up hurting yourself, then
you deserve our help, not ourjails. Finally, if you do hurt other peo-
ple, whether you are under the influence of drugs or not, then you
should be punished. That is what our criminal justice system should
be about. It seems to me that this moral argument makes a lot more
sense than the one you hear from politicians today.
Lee I. Dogoloff:*
I would like to ask you to think about this issue along with me.
Not in the sense of quick phrases and cute scenarios, but based on
what we really know about legalization, what the evidence is. It
seems to me that what we're talking about here is public policy. Pub-
* Executive Director, American Council for Drug Education.
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lic policy should follow science, and it should follow knowledge, and
it should follow our experience, not emotion or expedience.
All of us would love to find a way for the drug abuse problem in
our society to go away. We all recognize its terrible consequences.
But it seems to me that quick fixes just won't work. The legalization
issue has really been around for a long time. Twenty years ago,
when people were talking about legalization, it was really out of ig-
norance. They were saying, "Well, these drugs aren't particularly
harmful and they won't do very much damage, so why don't we just
legalize them?"
Today, legalization has become an issue, due to a sense of frus-
tration, because people know only too well the terrible consequences
of drug use. They're frustrated; they want a quick fix. I think certain
policies do need to be changed, but we also have to understand this
issue.
We must first understand what the principles of psychoactive
drugs are. These are drugs that by their very nature act on the plea-
sure centers of the brain. They are pleasurable. People who experi-
ence pleasure from drugs want to repeat that pleasurable experience.
That causes people to want to do it over and over again, leading to
dependence. To assume that you can make drugs readily available
and yet confine their consequences to a small portion of the popula-
tion defies the very nature of the way these drugs act.
Drugs are illegal because they are bad and because they are de-
structive and not the other way around. When a drug acts on the
brain and on the body, the drug doesn't know its legal status. For
example, in 1987, one half of all child abuse fatalities in Philadelphia
involved cocaine-using parents. In New York City, 73% of children's
-deaths from neglect and abuse are linked to drugs. Almost 15% of
all babies born in San Francisco General Hospital have cocaine in
their systems. A ConRail engineer's drug use resulted in the loss of
16 lives and over $75 billion in damage claims. One third of all pa-
tients treated at the Maryland Shock Trauma Center for serious acci-
dents used marijuana just prior to their accidents. One quarter of all
New York drivers involved in fatal accidents had recently used co-
caine. These are the consequences of drug use. It doesn't make any
difference whether these drugs are legal or illegal. This is what they
do.
We should learn from experience rather than just proceed with
risky and uncertain options and promises. One example from which
we can learn is the British experience. Some people say that legaliza-
tion really worked and that when the British legalized heroin every-
thing was fine. Well, first of all, they never legalized heroin; and
second of all, when they tried to make it legally available through
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physicians, it quickly got out of control. So British legalization never
did work.
The same is true with the Iranian experience. Iran tried to make
opium available to registered opium addicts through pharmacy dis-
tribution. When I was there working with the Iranian government,
there was heroin trouble because of all the spillover from the legiti-
mate market. Their problem was every bit as bad as, if not worse
than, ours.
Our Vietnam experience demonstrates what happens when
drugs are cheap and available. Twenty percent of our GIs became
addicted to opium during the height of the Vietnam conflict. There
was great concern that when they came back to the United States
they would maintain that addiction. Fortunately, that did not hap-
pen. Only 2% continued their addictions when they returned to the
United States. Why? Because it was a lot less available, because
there were legal sanctions against its use, and because they had to
get into a kind of a subculture that they didn't want to be involved
with in order to get heroin. The moral: Legal sanctions work.
Italy provides a current example of what legalization does. It
recently decriminalized possession of small amounts of heroin for
personal use. Thanks to that policy, Italy now has a raging, mostly
middle class heroin problem with the highest heroin overdose rates
in all of Europe. Do we have to repeat that? Can't we learn?
Alaska has the most liberal laws in this country relative to mari-
juana possession. When they screened people to work on the Valdez
oil spill, 25% of the applicants couldn't be hired because they
showed up positive. That is at least double, maybe triple, what you
would find in other places in this country with pre-employment drug
screening. Availability encourages use; legal sanctions do in fact
modify behavior.
You have heard a little bit about Prohibition today. Let me tell
you the facts about Prohibition. While it's true it was a public policy
failure, it was a public health success. We should learn from it. Dur-
ing Prohibition, deaths from cirrhosis of the liver fell from almost
30% per 100,000 to 10% per 100,000. Admissions to state mental
hospitals for alcohol psychosis fell from 10% in 1919 to 3.7% in
1922.
There were problems associated with Prohibition, but there are
lessons to be learned from it. One of the lessons is that when you
decrease the availability of a drug, like alcohol, and increase legal
sanctions, you do, in fact, decrease consumption and the negative
consequences associated with consumption.
Another thing we learned from Prohibition is that you can't go
back. What I mean by that is that once you take a drug and make it
legal, like alcohol, you can't turn around and make it illegal. Some
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say, "Let's try to make cocaine and marijuana legal, see if it works,
and if it doesn't work we can go back." That won't work; we've
learned that.
Basically, there is relatively little support in America for this no-
tion of legalization. The vast majority of Americans, and all the pub-
lic opinion polls, say that we do not favor it. Sure some people are
frustrated with the system, but they are not willing to send up the
white flag and throw in the towel.
You have heard an economic argument that reduced law en-
forcement costs will result from legalization. Well, I'm not sure
that's really true. The black market for drugs will not completely
disappear. Let's look at what legal drugs cost us. Alcohol abuse
costs 89 billion dollars a year. Then there is the argument that legal-
ization will generate tax revenues. Well, you know what the tax reve-
nues are for alcohol that offset that 89 billion dollar cost? Ten
billion dollars. Not a great way to balance the federal budget.
Three'hundred fifty Americans die every day from illnesses asso-
ciated with alcohol, and 1,000 die prematurely from illnesses associ-
ated with tobacco use. We already have two deadly legal drugs. We
can see what happens when they are readily available and socially
sanctioned.
Some argue that law enforcement savings should be invested in
education and treatment. We need to fund enforcement, education
and treatment-all three. Law enforcement and the legal sanctions
themselves do, in fact, reduce initial drug use. We do not have to
throw out the baby with the dirty bath water.
There are some common sense arguments against legalization,
too. There is a relationship between availability and use. If you in-
crease the availability of the drug, you will increase its use. If you
increase its use, you will increase the problems associated with its
use. That is certainly proven by our current experience with cocaine.
The availability has increased, and the problems have increased. In
the past five years the number of hospital emergencies associated
with the use of cocaine have increased 421%. The number of co-
caine related deaths increased 153% from 1984 to 1988. Freebasing
of cocaine, with which more serious consequences are associated,
has become much more common. We already know what happens
when you make a drug cheaper and more available.
Then there is the issue of message confusion. How do you con-
vince people of the negative effects of using drugs like cocaine and
marijuana and at the same time have the government involved in a
distribution system? How do you square that away? The one neces-
sary prerequisite for the social acceptance of any drug and its wide-
spread use is the perception of safety. If the general public does not
perceive the drug as safe, they will not use it. But if the government
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gets involved in distributing it, how do we teach our children not to
use it? How do we teach our children not to use it when we change
our policy and make it available? We have a tough enough time with
alcohol. We are a lot more successful in preventing illegal drug use
among children than we are with alcohol, a legal drug.
There is also an ethical issue. I think there is an ethical problem
with the governmental involvement in the sale and distribution of
things that are clearly harmful. We do have a lot of other social
problems, but I submit that drug abuse negatively impacts virtually
all of our other social problems. Teenage pregnancy, low education
scores, unemployment, infant mortality, child abuse and neglect, all
of these problems are only made worse by drug abuse in our society.
How do you teach a child to learn when he is loaded? I don't know
how you do that. You first have to get the child sober before the
child can learn. Each of these problems is exacerbated by drugs in
our society.
The entire argument for legalization, it seems to me, breaks
down when you begin to question how it would work. Who would
dispense the drugs? Would all drugs be covered? Would we, for
example, distribute crack to anyone who wanted it in New York City?
Would we also do it in Cheyenne, Wyoming? This is a matter of
national policy. At what age would it be legal for people to purchase
these drugs? Would pregnant women be able to use them? Would
people be able to drive after using drugs? How would drug use and
distribution be monitored? Would we still have laws against sales to
people who are under age? Would we still have to enforce laws
against black marketing of drugs?
We have a hard enough time dealing with drug abuse today,
when the drugs are illegal. The illegality prevents a lot of people
from using them. If you ever have any question about that, think
about it when you are driving down the highway and then you see
that police car coming your way. If you ever ride in a police car,
amazingly, you will see all the noses of cars in the oncoming traffic
tipped down. That is because people respond to the threat of legal
consequences. What a law does is embody and codify our social or-
der and our social mores. Our social mores are against the use of
drugs.
In summary, it seems to me that we cannot solve a problem just
by redefining it. I agree that the policy of the 1980s has been misdi-
rected. I agree that we have put too much emphasis on border in-
terdiction and trying to keep drugs out of the country. We have
talked in terms of demand reduction and treatment and prevention.
But at the same time, the spending has been primarily on enforce-
ment. That is changing. There is now a 100% increase in the
budget for drug treatment in this country. We are doing more and
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more with the prevention of drug use every day. We need to-abso-
lutely. But if you increase the availability of drugs, if you think the
problem is costly now, you ain't seen nothing yet. It will be expen-
sive to treat the additional casualties.
I am a clinician, and I treat youngsters and adults and families
who have this problem. I see this on a daily basis. When you see on
a day-to-day basis how tough it is to recover, and the heartache and
the lifelong problems that these drugs cause, you realize that legali-
zation is not the answer. It is not the answer to tell people that it is
okay to use drugs because the government is now involved in
distribution.
It is very important that we continue our current policy of com-
bining enforcement, treatment, and prevention. People say we're
not winning this one, but there are a lot of bright hopes out there.
High school surveys say that kids who stay in high school use a lot
less drugs than they did ten years ago. For example, drug use by
high school seniors in virtually every major category has declined
every year since 1979. In 1979 half of the seniors reported some use
of marijuana during the prior year. By 1988 the number was down
to one-third. Daily marijuana use had fallen even more, from 11%6 in
1979 to 2.7%6 in 1988. That does not say to me that nothing is work-
ing. That says to me that people who stay in school have gotten the
message. That says to me that people can respond to an education
message. There are real changes occurring in our society. Attitudes
are hardening; use patterns are changing. I am not naive enough to
say that we have solved this problem; we haven't by a long shot.
What we are finding is that the people who continue to use drugs are
getting into more trouble with them than ever before, but fewer and
fewer Americans are using drugs. It would be insane, it seems to me,
to turn around and turn our policy upside down.
Statistics clearly demonstrate that what we are doing is working.
We are not going to solve the problem today or tomorrow. One of
the things that we as Americans have a hard time with is waiting for
things to unravel over the long term. We want instant gratification.
That is what the drug issue is all about. I submit that with everything
positive that is happening in the world, now is not the time to give
up.
Lacy Thornburg:*
I disagree, of course, that legalization of drugs is what we should
be doing. It's a simple idea, but it's a dangerous one, and it's plain
wrong. I do not expect to come across as being objective on this
particular subject, but I saw first-hand for seventeen years, as a Supe-
* Attorney General of North Carolina. B.A., J.D., University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill.
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rior Court judge, some of the things that result from drug abuse and
drug use.
I know that it doesn't happen every time, and thank God that it
doesn't, but in the five years that I have been your Attorney General
I have seen a lot of bad things happen as a result of drug abuse.
Statistics from a variety of studies consistently show that drugs are
involved, either directly or indirectly, in 70% of the major crimes
that are committed in this country. That's what a major study in New
York shows, that's what one in Washington, D.C. shows, and that's
what a variety of them in other cities around the country show. What
has been done in this state tends to support that figure. It varies
from city to city, but my point is that drug use can be dangerous. As
your Attorney General, it is my responsibility to respond to the drug
legalization idea. So I want to do my best.
I noticed Professor Nadelmann seemed to be bothered with the
term "legalization." It would bother me too if I were trying to sup-
port legalization of drugs, because when you say that you are going
to legalize, at some point some lines will have to be drawn. At some
point you are going to have to say that a person is too young to be
exposed to the free purchase of some of these drugs. Lines will also
have to be drawn that say what drugs will be legalized and to what
extent.
I do not know how many, if any, of you have ever had any per-
sonal experience with family members and others who have been
caught in a web that involved heroin, LSD, cocaine, the new ice, or
whatever, but if you have, you know first-hand that it is dangerous.
Even the proponents of legalization admit that drug use will in-
crease if it is made readily available to the general population. They
concede that, because it is now illegal in this state, some people
aren't going to use it because they don't want to violate the law. A
New Jersey study found that 70% of the drug-free students surveyed
said the fear of "getting in trouble with the law" prevented their use
of drugs. So, it does make a difference whether or not drug laws are
on the books.
You have been told that alcohol, tobacco, and coffee are danger-
ous. All of that is true, but I have been out of law school now for
thirty years, and I have yet to hear of a robbery, murder, rape, bur-
glary, or whatever that happened from abuse of nicotine or caffeine.
It just has not happened.
Is the criminal law effective? I think so, and I also think that we
should continue prohibiting the use of dangerous drugs. We owe it
to ourselves to be constantly looking at how we can best control
problem areas. As pointed out, however, when you take away these
prohibitions, then use increases and a variety of illnesses and other
results increase. It would be a very major error to send the message
1990]
N.C.J. INT'L. L. & CoM. REG.
to youngsters all across this state and nation that "it's okay now for
you to say 'yes.'" I think the law means "no," and should continue
to mean "no."
Is it expensive to enforce these laws? Certainly it is expensive to
have good law enforcement. Certainly it is expensive to have courts
and it is expensive to have prisons. It is also expensive to have
crime. It is expensive to have treatment. It is expensive to have edu-
cation. It is also expensive to business and industry. If you sit down
with business and industrial leaders, none of them will say that they
want their work forces using illegal drugs, whether it is coke, heroin,
or just plain marijuana, because it simply is not going to increase
their alertness. They know what the cost is to them. If it were other-
wise, we would suggest that before you get on a plane, you would
want to be sure that your pilot had taken a couple puffs from a joint
so he'd be on top of things; an engineer who was running the train
certainly ought to have at least one snort of coke to get him ready; a
gun-toting law enforcement officer, if you legalize, certainly wouldn't
be told not to be using drugs while he is about his business. It just
doesn't make sense to me.
It didn't work in England, it's not working in Amsterdam, and it
didn't work in China. It's hard to imagine what would happen in the
United States if we tried controlled distribution of coke, crack, LSD,
methamphetamines, and all the rest. To even suppose that the black
market would change is just plain taking a simple look at a complex
problem. Everywhere it's happened, it's become worse instead of
better, because a drug user is never satisfied with the amount that he
is being given; there's going to be a backstreet market for them.
It doesn't matter whether it's backstreet or main street, when
you purchase and use drugs there will be a significant effect on your
mind and body. You lose judgment, you lose inhibition, you get irra-
tional, you break laws, and you kill people. That happens regardless
of where you get the drugs.
What groups are we going to let purchase it? Where are we go-
ing to set the age limits and all the rest? What quantities? This is
just the wrong time to start talking about legalization. We are begin-
ning to make some progress in the area. We are beginning because
the people in this state and nation are beginning to say no. It would
be wrong for us at this time to show that we are becoming more
tolerant.
A variety of studies that have been quoted show that the use of
drugs are definitely involved in, or certainly the increase problems
in, the areas of teenage pregnancy, high school dropouts, unemploy-
ment, infant mortality, family dysfunction, and teen suicides; drug
use compounds these problems.
I do not believe the pro-legalization forces are motivated by any
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sinister side, but they are probably more frustrated with the difficulty
and the perceived slowness in solving the problem. However, they
are no more frustrated than am I and the rest of us who work on it
every day. It is a serious problem that we need to solve, but I do not
see a quick fix to it. Drug availability, drug consumption, and drug-
related violence increases even though we do have some stronger
and tougher drug laws. Yet we are beginning to see it turn around
some. The most effective means, and this comes from experience in
other countries, of solving a drug epidemic is to use a variety of
strong law enforcement, interdiction programs, public education,
and treatment. That is what we are doing here in North Carolina.
With the combined forces of law enforcement, education, and treat-
ment we will have to gain ground. I understand being impatient, but
what has been developing over a long number of years cannot be
solved overnight. It has been growing for the number of years that I
have seen it, but I do not think legalizing drugs is the answer.
To suggest that illegal drug use is a victimless crime misses the
point. What it does is create more victims. The answer to the drug
problem is not cheap or quick or easy. Long term effort, long term
commitment by society, and a consistent government policy are go-
ing to be required. Anti-drug laws will make a difference. Looking
for a quick fix is an exercise in futility when you need to be using
common sense and resolve. I do not think we can surrender. We
have to continue enforcing the laws and devoting the necessary re-
sources to getting the job done. A lot of Americans have been af-
fected by problems associated with drug use, but none have been
affected as much or to the extent that our young people have. It is a
sad situation when you see a baby that has just been born to a co-
caine addicted mother, or you see a teenager whose mind has been
fried with an overdose of LSD and paid the real penalty. This baby
had no opportunity to decide whether drugs were going to be used.
These children that lack families, the children that are poor, and the
children with limited opportunities are the ones right here in North
Carolina and around the nation that suffer disproportionately as a
result of drug abuse. The kids are not to blame, they simply have
inherited the problem.
Responsibility and self-control are going to be necessary for all
of us working together, wherever we fit within society, in trying to
get this drug problem solved. That is the way it is going to be
solved-by a concerted effort. We have to set limits and place stan-
dards. Quite honestly, I think we are our brother's keeper. All of us
have to do our part. Legalizing drugs is simply not the answer.
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U.S. Demand and Latin American Society
A speech presented on March 19, 1990, at the University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill
Maria Jimena Duzan:*
If victories were to be measured by the blood that has been shed
in battle, Colombia would have won the drug war a long time ago.
The drug trafficking network that now dominates Colombia is en-
gaged in much more than hand-to-hand combat. It is attempting to
seize control of the democratic institutions of a country that was
once proud of being the oldest democracy in Latin America.
Brazil, Peru, and Bolivia also have problems with drug dealers,
cocaine production and shipment, and corruption that have dramati-
cally eroded their governmental and political institutions. Neverthe-
less, the drug bosses have sought to consolidate their monopoly of
power in Colombia, not in Peru, Bolivia, or Brazil.
Colombia was chosen because of its strategic geographic loca-
tion. A front and back door between continents, this country of
thirty million has a seacoast on both the Atlantic and Pacific oceans.
More important than geographic considerations is the easy assimila-
tion of the narcos into Colombian society. The drug bosses and
their money were initially well-received by the Colombians. The
country's business sector, landowners, and poor people saw sudden
wealth and lavish lifestyles where once there had been hopelessness.
Like all the world, Colombians accepted the drug bosses without
considering the consequences. Thus, Pablo Escobar was elected to
Congress in 1982, although his involvement in the cocaine trade was
well-known; Carlos Lehder organized a political movement to lobby
for what has become the rallying cry of the drug set: no extradition
to the United States.1
The state only reacted when the drug bosses tried to seize by
force what they had corrupted from within. These attempts occurred
at different moments in the battle. Probably the first and most im-
portant was the assassination, in 1985, of Justice Minister Rodrigo
Lara Bonilla.
It was already too late for the state to act. By that time, the drug
bosses were prosperous farmers who had the support of other land-
owners. They were businessmen generating employment in areas
where mere subsistence had always been the rule. One cabinet
member referred to them as "illustrious entrepeneurs." They were
even partners in joint economic ventures with the government itself.
Ms. Duzan is a journalist with the newspaper El Espectador in Bogoti, Colombia.
I [Ironically, Lehder was eventually extradited to the United States to be held in a
Florida jail.-ED.]
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Now the drug bosses have a political project. In certain regions,
and with the help of certain landowners and middle ranking officers
of the army, they have sponsored private armies and have created
narco-paramilitary squads. The goal of these squads is to protect the
country from the threat of guerrillas and communism. Unfortu-
nately, what started as self-defense has ended in a bloody war that is
endangering the most precious right in our democracy: tolerance for
others' opinions.
Economists estimate that, over the last decade, Colombia has re-
ceived 3.5 billion dollars per year in direct benefits from the drug
trade. The drug dealers behave like good patriots in spending the
revenues obtained from their drug business. At least half of the
yearly profits from their drug businesses are invested in Colombia.
This money amounts to seven percent of Colombia's GDP. Salom6n
Kalmanovitz, a prominent Colombian economist, says that revenues
from drug smuggling now represents sixty percent of the nation's
wealth-an estimated 120 billion dollars.
The penetration of the drug cartels in Colombia seems irrevers-
ible. During the last five years, the cocaine mafia has bought so
much land, particularly in those regions where there is discontent
among the peasantry and a strong presence of guerrillas, that Co-
lombia has suffered what could be called a "narco-land reform." To-
day the drug apparatchiks own about 2.5 million acres of land.
Ironically, despite the violent and bloody enforcement practices of
the drug mafia, this acquisition of land has brought a boom to agri-
cultural regions which once knew only stagnant depression.
The drug mafia is everywhere in Colombia. It has penetrated
the financial sector; it owns banks and has invested in a web of inter-
national ventures; it has a stake in major coal and emerald mining
operations, all legally awarded by the government. The drug empire
also includes radio and television stations, hotel chains, drug stores
and legal pharmaceutical labs. More notably, the drug bosses con-
trol two of the most popular sports in Colombia: soccer and boxing.
Drug traffickers own twelve of the sixteen Colombian profes-
sional soccer teams. They hold the contracts of top players like Rene
Higuita, the goalkeeper of the Colombian National Team. In a re-
cent interview in the Italian newspaper, Corriere della Sera, Higuita
said that Pablo Escobar is not a bad guy-what happens is that no-
body understands him because he likes to help the poor.
The drug mafia's involvement in sports is a more complicated
issue since Colombian soccer has become internationally competitive
during the last two years. Colombians are proud of their soccer
team, yet the blood has begun to flow. In late 1989, a soccer referee
was murdered after protests about a game he officiated between two
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mafia-owned teams. Public outrage caused the soccer authorities to
cancel the coming year's national tournament.
The dramatic decomposition of Colombian society is a conse-
quence of drug smuggling. In terms of social strata, the middle class
feels the most pressure. From above, the middle class is attacked
and corrupted by the drug bosses' wealth, while from below, they are
victims of the violence of the mafia's poor foot-soldiers. Judges, po-
lice, and army-all middle class-are tempted by drug wealth and,
thus, are fertile grounds for corruption. In an interview months
before he was killed in a shootout, Jose Gonzalo Rodriguez, perhaps
the most powerful Colombian kingpin, laughed as he said that the
government gives the army medals; the mafia gives them money.
For Colombians, the drug war has become an ambiguous fight.
On one hand, the government declares a war against narco-terror-
ism. On the other hand, the government accepts drug money to help
Colombia's faltering economy.
Meanwhile, the repressive U.S. drug policies in the Andean
countries do not address the real problems in Colombia. The drug
war has been increasingly militarized; the armies of Colombia, Bo-
livia, Peru, and the United States are engaged. The drug problem is
no longer regarded as a police matter. What has happened to our
civil rights?. Must this war be fought without any regard for human
rights? Is this repressive approach preserving the last of Colombian
democracy? Has this type of policy been able to control the drug
business? After ten years of law enforcement and repressive policies
in Colombia, the drug business not only has managed to survive, but
it has successfully increased its profits. In fact, Forbes magazine con-
siders Pablo Escobar to be one of the ten wealthiest men in the
world.
For now, Colombia alone must resolve its problems and con-
flicts. Until the state offers new social, economic, and political alter-
natives to the Colombian people, the social illness caused by the
drug trade will continue to flourish. Even if the drug boom de-
creases, Colombia must still deal with the consequences of its
penetration.
Colombia needs a land reform promoted and organized by the
state, not imposed by the will of drug bosses or the fists of guerrillas.
To make this happen, Colombia needs structural changes and new
political parties. Short-term solutions and repressive policies that
weaken our democracy cannot win this war. If the world does not
understand that this is an international problem, then General Maza,
the courageous Chief of Colombian Secret Police, may succeed in
stopping Pablo Escobar, but dozens of other Escobars will be ready
to replace him.
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